Collective bargaining structure and its determinants: an empirical analysis with British and German establishment data by Schnabel, Claus et al.
www.ssoar.info
Collective bargaining structure and its
determinants: an empirical analysis with British and
German establishment data
Schnabel, Claus; Zagelmeyer, Stefan; Kohaut, Susanne
Postprint / Postprint
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
www.peerproject.eu
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Schnabel, C., Zagelmeyer, S., & Kohaut, S. (2006). Collective bargaining structure and its determinants: an empirical
analysis with British and German establishment data. European Journal of Industrial Relations, 12(2), 165-188. https://
doi.org/10.1177/0959680106065036
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter dem "PEER Licence Agreement zur
Verfügung" gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zum PEER-Projekt finden
Sie hier: http://www.peerproject.eu Gewährt wird ein nicht
exklusives, nicht übertragbares, persönliches und beschränktes
Recht auf Nutzung dieses Dokuments. Dieses Dokument
ist ausschließlich für den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen
Gebrauch bestimmt. Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments
müssen alle Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise
auf gesetzlichen Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses
Dokument nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen
Sie dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under the "PEER Licence
Agreement ". For more Information regarding the PEER-project
see: http://www.peerproject.eu This document is solely intended
for your personal, non-commercial use.All of the copies of
this documents must retain all copyright information and other
information regarding legal protection. You are not allowed to alter
this document in any way, to copy it for public or commercial
purposes, to exhibit the document in public, to perform, distribute
or otherwise use the document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-222704
Claus Schnabel, Stefan Zagelmeyer, and
Susanne Kohaut
Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Internationale Fachhochschule
Bad Honnef-Bonn and Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und
Berufsforschung, Nürnberg, GERMANY
Collective Bargaining Structure and
its Determinants: An Empirical
Analysis with British and German
Establishment Data
ABSTRACT ■ Both Britain and Germany have experienced a substantial
decline in collective bargaining coverage in recent decades, though coverage
is lower in Britain. Whereas multi-employer bargaining predominates in
Germany, single-employer bargaining is more important in Britain.
Econometric analyses show that similar variables play a statistically
significant role in explaining the structure of collective bargaining in both
countries; these include establishment size and age, foreign ownership,
public sector affiliation and subsidiary status.
KEYWORDS: collective bargaining ■ bargaining coverage ■ Germany ■ United
Kingdom
Introduction
Collective bargaining coverage is an indicator of the practical relevance
of collective self-regulation by the labour market parties, and also reflects
the power of employers’ associations and unions as well as their capacity
to shape the regulation of the employment relationship and the labour
market.
In his seminal analysis of the decentralization of collective bargaining
in industrialized countries, Katz (1993: 19) stated that ‘there are few
systematic quantitative data tracing the evolution of bargaining struc-
ture’. Since then, several studies have provided cross-national data on the
structure and coverage of collective bargaining (for example, Traxler and
Behrens, 2002; Visser, 2003), on the basis of which there have been
empirical analyses of the macro determinants of bargaining centralization
European Journal of Industrial Relations
© 2006 SAGE (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi)
Volume 12 Number 2 pp 165–188 www.sagepublications.com
DOI: 10.1177/0959680106065036
(Traxler, 1996; Traxler et al., 2001). Other research has analysed the deter-
minants of collective bargaining centralization in the United States by
using industry-level data (Greenberg, 1966a and 1966b; Hendricks and
Kahn, 1982 and 1984). However, the micro determinants of employer
demand for collective bargaining and of firms’ (as well as unions’) choice
of governance structures for the employment relationship have received
less attention in empirical work (notable exceptions being Deaton and
Beaumont, 1980; Booth, 1989), perhaps partly because of a lack of
suitable data on the company or establishment level. In recent years, a
number of quantitative studies have been published for countries such as
Germany (Kohaut and Schnabel, 2003), France (Cahuc and Kramarz,
1997) and the UK (Zagelmeyer, 2004a), but there has been no attempt at
comparative quantitative analysis.1
This article tries to fill this gap by examining the determinants of firms’
choice of multi-employer, single-employer or no collective bargaining in
Britain and Germany. In both countries, multi-employer collective
bargaining played a leading role in the determination of the terms and
conditions of employment for most of the post-war period. German
industrial relations has displayed a ‘relative centralization of collective
bargaining . . . at sectoral level’ (Jacobi et al., 1998: 191), while multi-
employer bargaining also dominated pay determination for the British
workforce in establishments with 25 or more employees until the mid-
1980s (Brown et al., 2003: 199).
Britain and Germany have both experienced a decollectivization and
decentralization of collective bargaining, although these processes started
at different points in time, and decentralization has been more ‘organ-
ized’ in Germany (see Zagelmeyer, 2004b). In contrast, the prevailing
trend in collective bargaining coverage in most of the EU has been
stability (Traxler and Behrens, 2002). In this article we investigate econo-
metrically whether the same factors can explain the choice of bargaining
arrangements by British and German firms, and discuss the implications
for the future of collective bargaining coverage in both countries.
In the next section, we first outline the legal framework and recent
developments concerning collective bargaining in Britain and Germany,
then explore the incidence of collective bargaining in both countries, and
subsequently discuss the advantages and disadvantages of different
arrangements. Following this, we present a theoretical and empirical
analysis of the determinants of employer demand for collective bargain-
ing in Britain and Germany, estimating models for both countries using
representative data from the German Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und
Berufsforschung (IAB) Establishment Panel and the British Workplace
Employee Relations Survey (WERS). The final section discusses the
results from a comparative perspective and identifies issues for further
research.
European Journal of Industrial Relations 12(2)
166
Collective Bargaining in Britain and Germany: Legal
Background, Recent Trends and Incidence
Legal Background
British industrial relations actors — employers, unions and the state —
have traditionally preferred voluntary to legislative regulation of the
employment relationship (Edwards et al., 1992; Flanders, 1974; Gospel
and Palmer, 1993: 155). Without express reference in the individual
employment contract, collective agreements are not legally binding and
thus not enforceable by law, depending for their ultimate enforcement on
the sanctions available to the parties. Each union involved in the
conclusion of collective agreements must be recognized by the employer
for this purpose. Collective agreements may be reached at any level.
Single-employer agreements may be reached at establishment,
company, divisional or corporate level. At shop-floor level, a formal
system of collective agreements may coexist with informal rules and
agreements that are often termed ‘custom and practice’ (Brown, 1972). At
industry level, multi-employer bargaining may be conducted between
employers’ associations and trade unions or union confederations, at
national or local level.
The German system involves a dual system of representation through
trade unions and works councils, extensive juridification, encompassing
organizations on both sides of the labour market, and a system of
regional industry-level collective bargaining (Jacobi et al., 1998). The
constitutionally protected principle of autonomous bargaining (Tarif-
autonomie) gives organizations of employers and employees the right to
regulate working conditions without state interference.
Collective agreements are legally binding and may be concluded at
either industry level (Verbandstarifverträge) or single-employer level
(Firmentarifverträge). Bargaining is mainly conducted at regional
industry level, but in certain industries is frequent at national or company
level. Sectoral agreements can be extended by government regulation to
all employers and employees in an industry. Another form of collective
agreement is the works agreement (Betriebsvereinbarung), concluded
between a firm and its works council within the legal framework of co-
determination. These may not contain provisions which are generally
regulated by collective agreement (such as wages), unless expressly
permitted by the union–employer agreement.
Recent Developments
In Britain, industry-wide bargaining over terms and conditions of
employment became consolidated in the early 20th century, but signs of
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decentralization became apparent from the time of the Second World
War, with the rise of shop-floor bargaining. The Donovan Report in 1968
made clear that workplace bargaining had become more important than
was generally realized. After government attempts to formalize and
stabilize collective bargaining within the framework of national incomes
policies had failed, the significance of multi-employer collective bargain-
ing continued to decline through the 1970s, although formal coverage
rates remained quite high (Brown and Terry, 1978).
Between 1979 and 1997 there were major changes in bargaining
arrangements. Zagelmeyer (2004a) estimates the coverage rates of differ-
ent bargaining arrangements for British establishments with 25 or more
employees. While single-employer collective bargaining covered about
20 percent of those establishments between 1980 and 1990, it declined to
less than 15 percent in 1998. Multi-employer bargaining covered about
47 percent of those establishments in 1980 and 1984, but declined to 18
percent in 1998. Conversely, the prevalence of individual regulation (no
collective bargaining) grew from 33 to 68 percent of all establishments.
For western Germany, it has long been assumed that regional industry-
wide bargaining is the most important mechanism. Although no official
statistics exist, it was traditionally estimated that collective bargaining
covered around 90 percent of all employees (OECD, 1994). However,
decentralization was encouraged in the early 1970s by qualitative
bargaining policies, which aimed at ‘humanizing’ working life and
protecting employees against the adverse effects of rationalization and
technological change. Industry agreements now included provision for
negotiation over performance standards, work organization and rest
periods, to be determined at establishment level. When unions in the
metal and printing industries achieved their goal of a shorter working
week, they had to concede more flexible organization of working time,
to be implemented for example by works agreement (Bispinck, 1999).
In the 1990s, increasing international competition, high unemployment
and German unification accelerated changes in collective bargaining.
Increasingly, industry-wide collective agreements included so-called
‘opening clauses’ which authorized the lower levels, usually the employer
and the works council, to deviate from the multi-employer agreement in
order to save jobs. Following unification, the transfer of the western
German industrial relations and collective bargaining institutions to
eastern Germany resulted in a number of frictions, with employers’
associations and trade unions both facing difficulties in recruiting and
retaining members. A major challenge was the unions’ goal of bringing
eastern wages up to western levels, despite lower productivity, which
induced many firms to opt out of the system. Consequently, the number
of firms with company agreements more than doubled in the 1990s
(Bispinck, 1999; Hassel, 1999 and 2002; Schnabel, 1998 and 2003).
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Representative data show that between 1995 and 2001 the coverage rate
of multi-employer collective bargaining fell from 53 to 45 percent of all
western German establishments with one or more employees, and from
28 percent in 1996 to 22 percent in 2001 in eastern establishments. Single-
employer bargaining also seems to have fallen in recent years while indi-
vidual regulation has grown, but changes in the survey question mean
that these two developments cannot be traced over a longer period of
time (Kohaut and Schnabel, 1999 and 2003).
Incidence of Collective Bargaining in Britain and Germany
The availability of large-scale establishment surveys in Britain and
Germany makes it possible to estimate and compare bargaining coverage
rates. For Britain, we use WERS98, a nationally representative survey of
2191 establishments with 10 or more employees. For Germany, data for
the year 2000 are taken from the IAB Establishment Panel. Each year this
nationally representative panel surveys several thousand establishments
with at least one employee covered by social insurance.2 Table 1 displays
collective bargaining coverage rates, based on the weighted data of both
representative datasets.
In 1998, 26.8 percent of British establishments with 10 or more
employees were covered by collective pay bargaining, with 11.7 percent
covered primarily by single-employer collective bargaining and 15.1
percent by multi-employer bargaining. Single-employer bargaining
coverage varied between 7.5 percent for establishments with 10 to 19
employees and 43.8 percent for those with 1000 and more employees.
The respective figures for multi-employer bargaining coverage are 11.5
and 33.3 percent. Hence for both categories of collective bargaining,
coverage rates appear to be positively associated with establishment 
size.
Table 1 displays separate data for western and (post-communist)
eastern Germany, since these regions differ considerably in terms of
historical traditions and labour market conditions. In 2000, 48.1 percent
of western establishments were covered by collective bargaining, with 2.7
percent covered by single-employer and 45.4 percent by multi-employer
bargaining. In eastern Germany, 27.5 percent of all establishments were
covered by collective bargaining: 4.3 percent by single-employer and 23.2
percent by multi-employer bargaining. Again, as in Britain, coverage
rates appear to be positively associated with establishment size in both
parts of Germany. To facilitate comparisons with the British data, figures
for German establishments with 10 or more employees are presented in
the last line of Table 1. They reinforce the impression that single-
employer bargaining is relatively more important in Britain, whereas
multi-employer bargaining clearly predominates in Germany.
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TABLE 1. Bargaining Coverage in Britain and Germany by Establishment Size (%)
Establishment size Great Britain (1998) Western Germany (2000) Eastern Germany (2000)
(number of
Single-employer Multi-employer Single-employer Multi-employer Single-employer Multi-employeremployees)
CB CB CB CB CB CB
1–9 na na 2.0 40.9 3.2 18.2
10–19 7.5 11.5 3.1 54.1 6.9 33.0
20–49 10.3 16.3 4.7 59.7 7.1 44.0
50–99 14.5 15.6 8.8 56.9 11.6 48.1
100–199 20.9 23.5 8.2 64.8 13.1 53.8
200–499 32.6 19.1 10.1 68.9 17.3 56.6
500–999 41.7 16.7 12.9 78.4 12.2 74.5
1000 and above 43.8 33.3 12.7 81.2 16.9 77.0
Average 11.7 15.1 2.7 45.4 4.3 23.2
Average, 10 or more 11.7 15.1 4.6 57.1 8.0 39.9
employees
Note: CB = collective bargaining.
Sources: WERS98, IAB Establishment Panel 2000; own calculations based on weighted data.
However, it is important to note that the questions regarding bargain-
ing arrangements are different in the two surveys. WERS98 asked for the
mode of pay-setting, including collective bargaining levels, for different
occupational groups. An establishment was coded as subject to a particu-
lar collective bargaining level if it applied to at least one occupational
group. Where different groups were under different bargaining arrange-
ments, the highest (or most centralized) was chosen. In contrast, the IAB
asks whether the establishment is subject to a multi-employer or single-
employer collective agreement, with no explicit reference to pay deter-
mination or to occupational group. Although it seems plausible that the
highest level of collective bargaining in Britain is similar to the highest
level of pay determination, one could also argue that the limitation to the
pay issue might cause an underestimation of the general level of collec-
tive bargaining coverage.
Advantages and Disadvantages of Different Levels of Regulation
Since some firms prefer single-employer collective bargaining while
others prefer multi-employer agreements to determine terms and
conditions of employment, different types of bargaining arrangement
presumably have specific advantages and disadvantages for industrial
relations actors. These have been widely discussed in economics, politi-
cal science and sociology (for example, Aidt and Tzannatos, 2002;
Berthold and Fehn, 1996; Calmfors, 1993; Flanagan, 2003; Moene et al.,
1993; OECD, 1997; Traxler et al., 2001). While much research has
examined the association between the degree of centralization of a
national bargaining system and macroeconomic performance (Calmfors
and Driffill, 1988; OECD, 1997), only recently has the focus of attention
shifted to the level of pay determination as an explicit decision by the
company (Freeman and Gibbons, 1995; Lindbeck and Snower, 2001;
Ramaswamy and Rowthorn, 1993; Zagelmeyer, 2004a).
From a macroeconomic perspective, one may assume that any
negative effects of collective agreements and wage rises for other
employees, employers and consumers are more likely to be internalized,
the higher the degree of centralization or coordination of collective
bargaining, since bargaining parties at central level cannot escape
negative macroeconomic effects such as unemployment. On the other
hand, centralized negotiations cannot fully use the information, capabil-
ities and flexibility available at local level and the outcomes are less likely
to reflect the economic situation and specific needs of individual estab-
lishments and companies.
Decentralized solutions, either single-employer collective agreements
or individual regulation, permit agreements tailored to the situation of
the company or establishment, including local labour market conditions.
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Decentralized regulation should thus provide for a differentiated wage
structure and maximization of employment opportunities. However, if
the demands of a company’s workforce are not only oriented to its
specific situation, but rather to the terms and conditions in other estab-
lishments or companies, this may lead to pay leapfrogging, particularly if
unions are organized above the company level. This may be associated
with higher wage increases, supposedly shifting the costs to unemployed
outsiders, and national policy-makers will have difficulties in steering
macroeconomic wage and price movements.
From the perspective of the company, collective agreements signifi-
cantly reduce transaction costs by substituting one set of negotiations for
a large number of individual bargains and by standardizing the terms and
conditions of employment. This advantage is positively associated with
the degree of bargaining centralization and bargaining coverage. In
addition, wages are largely taken out of competition by multi-employer
bargaining, and the shift of industrial conflict to a level above the
company reduces the danger that disputes will sour the working atmos-
phere within the establishment.
In addition to transaction costs, power factors affect employer
considerations (Arrowsmith et al., 2003): unionized employers can pool
their strength and prevent leapfrogging by bargaining at multi-employer
level, which may also minimize the power of the local union(s). The
capacity to pool power collectively increases with the homogeneity of
activities across firms, whereas greater heterogeneity of activities across
companies makes even tacit collusion more difficult. Arrowsmith et al.
(2003: 368) argue that intensive competition, which increases uncertainty
and instability and acts as pressure for localization in transaction-cost
terms, strengthens management’s control over the employment relation-
ship. It would further increase management’s power to use ‘divide and
rule’ tactics against the unions when it comes to investment decisions
between production sites.
Thörnquist (1999: 80), focusing on Sweden, emphasizes politico-
ideological motives related to the balance of power between capital and
labour as ‘of utmost importance’ in shaping employer preferences for a
particular bargaining level. Centralized systems increase union power
and employers may thus favour decentralized bargaining in order to
protect management prerogative and control over the employment
relationship. Traxler (2003: 2, 19) identifies a tension between perform-
ance (or efficiency) considerations and political motives, but concludes
that ‘extended managerial control may be seen [by the employers] as an
end in itself or as a means of improving performance’. The various advan-
tages and disadvantages discussed above point to a potential conflict
between the company and macroeconomic perspectives, implying that
generally applicable and efficient solutions may be difficult to find.
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Furthermore, the advantages and disadvantages of different regulation
levels may change over time.
The optimal level of regulation as well as collective bargaining coverage
may be affected by macroeconomic trends in various ways. On the one
hand, the degree of centralization may increase, because (for Germany)
EMU requires a higher degree of nominal wage flexibility, and because it
is often assumed that the coordination of collective bargaining will help
achieve this better. On the other hand, the prevailing trend over the last
decade has been a reduction in inflation rates, and consequently a reduced
need for centralized negotiations to ensure wage moderation. Increased
unemployment as well as the option of moving production abroad may
make decentralized negotiations more attractive for companies, because
they reduce insider power and improve the employer’s bargaining
position. Growing international competition and the increased speed of
technological change also entail that the transaction-cost advantage of
centralized arrangements decreases in favour of the informational and
flexibility advantages of decentralized regulation. Globalization is associ-
ated with the increasing importance of flexible work organization to
adapt to rapidly changing conditions in product markets, with a shift
from Taylorist work organization to greater team orientation, fewer
levels of hierarchy, increased individual responsibilities and job enlarge-
ment. Investment in firm-specific human capital, employee participation
and performance-related compensation become more important. The
relatively rigid rules established by collective bargaining, with limited
scope for decision-making on compensation systems and other person-
nel policies, may pose serious problems for many firms and prompt them
to opt out of the collective bargaining system.
Empirical Analysis
Previous Empirical Research in Britain and Germany
Despite a growing interest in cross-national variation and longitudinal
change in bargaining arrangements and coverage, empirical research on
their determinants is still relatively small and has not resulted in an estab-
lished set of consistent findings. Furthermore, to the best of our knowl-
edge no study has covered more than one country.
There exist only three studies of collective bargaining centralization in
Britain. The earliest quantitative study, by Deaton and Beaumont (1980),
is based on survey data covering 970 manufacturing firms and shows that
regional concentration, labour costs, union density and multi-unionism
are positively associated with centralization, while there are negative
associations for establishment size, foreign ownership and product
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market concentration. The other two studies are based on the WERS
Surveys. Booth (1989) shows that centralization is negatively associated
with establishment/organization size and foreign ownership, and posi-
tively associated with the share of labour costs in turnover. Zagelmeyer
(2004a) finds, however, that the influence of several independent variables
varies across years, so that their overall impact is not clear-cut.3
In addition, there has been considerable research on the determinants of
union recognition in Britain (Beaumont and Harris, 1989 and 1991;
Disney et al., 1995; Machin, 2000). Despite differences, a consistent
finding is that recognition is positively associated with organization and
establishment size and establishment age, and negatively associated with
foreign ownership and single-establishment companies.
There is more research on the determinants of bargaining arrangements
in Germany, but this is quite heterogeneous with regard to explanatory
determinants included in the models. Despite differences in detail,
analyses of the choice between decentralized regulation and multi-
employer collective bargaining (Bellmann et al., 1999; Kohaut and
Schnabel, 2003; Lehmann, 2002) show that establishment size, establish-
ment age, and being a subsidiary establishment of a multi-plant company
are positively associated with multi-employer collective bargaining.
Further research based on other datasets is mostly consistent with this
evidence and points to additional determinants such as union density and
workforce composition (Franz and Pfeiffer, 2001; Lehmann, 2002;
Hübler and Jirjahn, 2003).
Potential Determinants of Collective Bargaining Structure
Arguments regarding collective bargaining coverage and bargaining
centralization range from macro-level determinants (for recent summaries,
see Traxler et al., 2001; Zagelmeyer, 2004a) to micro-level determinants
(summarized by Lehmann, 2002; Zagelmeyer, 2004a). The present article
focuses on micro-level factors affecting the level of regulation of the
employment relationship. This section summarizes the theoretical argu-
ments regarding these determinants, focusing on employer choice between
three alternative options, namely individual regulation, single-employer
collective bargaining and multi-employer bargaining. We assume that the
employer has the right to make this choice unilaterally, but this does not
preclude negotiation with the union(s) over the bargaining structure and
the fact that power relations, and institutional factors (labour law, exten-
sion schemes, union strength, employers’ associations) will also influence
the choice. We go on to estimate an econometric model for the probabil-
ity that an establishment is associated with a certain governance structure.
Since our data are only cross-sectional and do not provide information on
all issues of interest from a theoretical perspective, the following analysis
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is not an exact testing of hard-to-quantify economic hypotheses, but
should rather be seen as an attempt to identify empirically certain charac-
teristics of establishments associated with different forms of regulation.
There are several reasons, in addition to the descriptive evidence
presented in Table 1, why company or establishment size may be posi-
tively associated with both union recognition and the centralization of
bargaining arrangements. As size increases, organizational structures
become more complex and personal relationships become more distant,
and costs associated with coordination, monitoring and communication
increase. Collective bargaining may reduce complexity and improve
communication. In addition, transaction costs of concluding individual
contracts increase with the number of employees and may be reduced by
collective agreements. In addition, centralized collective bargaining
provides collective goods, for example wage moderation. Large firms
may benefit particularly from the collective goods supplied by multi-
employer collective bargaining and hence disproportionately support
employers’ associations and sectoral bargaining arrangements (Kohaut
and Schnabel, 2003). The terms agreed in such bargaining are often
oriented towards the less profitable (and usually smaller) companies and
hence protect larger, more profitable firms from higher pay claims.
Another reason for a positive association between establishment or
company size and collective bargaining is that there may be economies
of scale for trade unions in terms of organizational activity. Larger estab-
lishments may thus be positively associated with unionization, higher
membership density and collective bargaining.
On the other hand, larger firms are more likely to experience distinc-
tive industrial relations problems, and have the organizational resources
to deal with them independently (Beaumont et al., 1980: 127); whereas
smaller companies have a greater need to enhance their bargaining
position by combination through multi-employer bargaining. In order to
control for non-linearities, we therefore include the establishment size
variable in linear and in squared form in the estimations. In addition, a
branch plant dummy variable catches the possibility that establishments
in multi-plant organizations might more likely be covered by collective
bargaining than independent establishments of similar size.
Establishment age may also play a role in bargaining arrangements:
recently established businesses (start-ups) often require more flexible
institutional arrangements at early stages of their existence. In addition,
institutional inertia could lead to path-dependency: companies that have
benefited from multi-employer bargaining in the past may retain this
arrangement because they have positive expectations of its problem-
solving capacity. Limitations in the German dataset force us to restrict
establishment age to a dummy variable taking on the value of 1 if the
establishment is not more than five years old.
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The association between bargaining arrangements and employment
structures is open to alternative hypotheses. A homogeneous workforce
may be positively associated with demand for collective regulation, as
there should be benefits from standardization; in contrast to establish-
ments with highly skilled employees, whose terms and conditions of
employment can best be regulated by individual contracts, those with a
large proportion of low-skilled employees may be more likely to be
covered by collective agreements. On the other hand, it is argued that
employees without qualifications or with very low levels of skills have
lower propensities to unionize and to handle their employment relation-
ships collectively. The lower levels of firm-specific human capital of such
employees also entail less demand for collective regulation on the
employer side, since the costs of opportunistic behaviour (and of substi-
tuting these workers) that could be reduced by collective regulation and
the union monitoring function are lower. In this case one might expect
the percentage of low-skilled workers to be negatively associated with
collective bargaining.
There exist few clear-cut theoretical hypotheses on how company
ownership influences choice among bargaining arrangements. It could be
argued that foreign ownership is negatively associated with collective
bargaining since the management of establishments controlled by foreign
multinationals may require distinctive institutional settings; multination-
als may develop their own company- or enterprise-specific employment
system which is incompatible with the predominant industrial relations
institutions in the host country. Their managements may also copy the
supposedly successful institutional and organizational configuration of
establishments in their country of origin. Unfortunately, we have no
complete data on the country of foreign ownership, but we apply a
dummy variable to test whether establishments that are predominantly
foreign-owned are more or less likely to rely on collective bargaining.
Our estimations also control for public-sector affiliation of the estab-
lishment. While the general behavioural assumption for private-sector
firms in capitalist economies is profit-maximization, public-sector estab-
lishments may follow different objectives. Beaumont and Gregory
(1980: 47) argue that public employers may encourage union organiz-
ation and collective bargaining in order to improve staff relations and
service, implying a positive association with collective bargaining.
Moreover, since such establishments, in particular in public adminis-
tration, have similar structures across the country, there may be benefits
from standardizing employment conditions through multi-employer
bargaining.
Finally, there may be industry-specific factors, such as the level of
collectively agreed wages and the quality of the employers’ association,
with an impact on collective bargaining coverage. This is (imperfectly)
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captured by including a set of industry dummy variables indicating the
sectoral affiliation of the main economic activity of the establishment.
Empirical Results
In our empirical analysis we make use of an ordered-probit model that
estimates the probability of choosing one of the three alternative options.
We thus assume that the dependent variable can be interpreted as an
ordered categorical variable, and this for at least two reasons. Following
the transaction-cost arguments outlined earlier, the probability of
choosing a specific bargaining arrangement increases from individual
regulation over single-employer collective bargaining to multi-employer
collective bargaining. The employer may reduce transaction costs by
moving from individual contracting to standardized single-employer
agreements, and even further if an employers’ association can deliver
collective agreements at lower cost and with additional advantages from
specialization effects, reduced risk of industrial action, sectoral standard-
ization of wages and so on. In contrast, under the aspects of flexibility
and differentiation, a firm’s probability of choosing a specific bargaining
arrangement should fall in the same order (with individual contracts
offering the greatest and multi-employer arrangements the least flexi-
bility and differentiation). Since both perspectives imply the same order
(albeit with different justifications and underpinnings), an ordered-probit
estimation is feasible (for details, see Greene, 2000: 875ff.). This is not to
deny that alternative models of employer choice are possible, all of which
require specific assumptions and have different strengths and weaknesses
that cannot be discussed in detail here.
Our empirical results are presented in Tables 2 and 3 in the form of
marginal effects (reflecting the effects of a one-unit change in a continu-
ous explanatory variable at its mean or of a discrete change of a dummy
variable from 0 to 1 with all other variables set at their sample means).
The same models are applied to Britain and to western and eastern
Germany. While the descriptive information on collective bargaining
incidence is based on weighted data, the econometric investigation uses
unweighted data, and all models include the stratification variables of the
representative surveys (industry dummies and establishment size) (see
Winship and Radbill, 1994 for a discussion of these methodological
issues). Definitions and descriptive statistics of the dependent and inde-
pendent variables used in these estimations can be found in Table A1. The
estimates show that almost all independent variables play a statistically
significant role in explaining the structure of collective bargaining,
although their precise effects differ in Britain and Germany.
We first interpret the public sector dummy variable because it provides
a good example of the similarities and differences among the three regions
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analysed. In accordance with expectations, establishments operating in
the public sector are more likely to have collective bargaining than other
establishments, ceteris paribus. This effect is very strong in Britain where
belonging to the public sector lowers the probability of no collective
bargaining by 56 percentage points, while increasing the probabilities of
single- and multi-employer bargaining by 15 and 41 percentage points
respectively (see Table 2). In western and eastern Germany, the probabil-
ity of multi-employer bargaining rises by only 13 and 21 percentage
points respectively, if an establishment operates in the public sector (see
Table 3).
The probability of multi-employer bargaining also increases with size
of establishment, but at a decreasing rate (indicated by the negative
coefficient of the quadratic in establishment size). This effect is strongest
in eastern Germany, where simulations show that increasing the size of
an establishment from 100 to 200 employees increases its probability of
multi-employer bargaining by 6 percentage points (whereas the respec-
tive effects are just 2 percentage points in western Germany and
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TABLE 2. Determinants of Collective Bargaining Structure in Britain (1998)
Explanatory variables No CB Single-employer Multi-employer
bargaining bargaining
Establishment size –0.0002** 0.0001** 0.0001**
(number of employees) (–6.27) (5.86) (6.20)
Establishment size squared 1.05 e-08** –0.52 e-09** –0.53 e-09**
(4.85) (–4.64) (–4.82)
Branch plant –0.20** 0.11** 0.09**
(dummy: 1 if yes) (–6.50) (5.48) (7.63)
Establishment age 0.07* –0.04* –0.03*
(dummy: 1 if 5 years or less) (2.18) (–2.05) (–2.31)
Low-skilled employees 0.0003 –0.0001 –0.0002
(percentage) (0.69) (–0.69) (–0.69)
Foreign ownership/control 0.10** –0.06** –0.05**
(dummy: 1 if yes) (3.38) (–3.08) (–3.70)
Public sector –0.56** 0.15** 0.41**
(dummy: 1 if yes) (–18.37) (11.88) (12.42)
Industry dummies yes** yes** yes**
n 2125 2125 2125
Pseudo R2 0.226 0.226 0.226
Note: Ordered-probit estimates; dependent variable is an index of the type of
collective bargaining; estimates shown are marginal effects. Heteroscedastic-
consistent z-values are in parentheses.
* denotes statistical significance at the 0.05 level.
** denotes statistical significance at the 0.01 level.
Source: WERS98; own estimations.
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TABLE 3. Determinants of Collective Bargaining Structure in Germany (2000)
Western Germany Eastern Germany
Explanatory variables No CB Single-employer Multi-employer No CB Single-employer Multi-employer
bargaining bargaining bargaining bargaining
Establishment size –0.0002** –0.00001** 0.0002** –0.0007** 0.00003** 0.0006**
(number of employees) (–5.58) (–4.94) (5.54) (–11.28) (7.23) (11.15)
Establishment size squared 4.47 e-09** 3.40 e-10** –4.81 e-09** –1.25 e-07** –5.85 e-09** –1.19 e-07**
(5.38) (4.93) (–5.36) (8.92) (–6.41) (–8.86)
Branch plant –0.17** –0.02** 0.19** –0.22** –0.005 0.22**
(dummy: 1 if yes) (–15.41) (–11.03) (15.18) (–12.31) (–0.30) (11.69)
Establishment age 0.14** 0.006** –0.15** 0.12** –0.009** –0.11**
(dummy: 1 if 5 years or less) (7.19) (11.08) (–7.43) (6.38) (–4.37) (–6.56)
Low-skilled employees 0.0005* 0.00004* –0.0005* 0.001** –0.00004** –0.001**
(percentage) (2.51) (2.49) (–2.51) (2.94) (–2.77) (–2.94)
Foreign ownership/control 0.05* 0.003* –0.05** –0.16** –0.001 0.16**
(dummy: 1 if yes) (2.01) (2.45) (–2.04) (–3.67) (–0.44) (3.47)
Public sector –0.12** –0.01** 0.13** –0.21** 0.001 0.21**
(dummy: 1 if yes) (–5.59) (–4.37) (5.46) (–7.15) (0.32) (6.85)
Industry dummies yes** yes** yes** yes** yes** yes**
n 8006 8006 8006 5301 5301 5301
Pseudo R2 0.110 0.110 0.110 0.156 0.156 0.156
Note: Ordered-probit estimates; dependent variable is an index of the type of collective bargaining; estimates shown are marginal effects.
Heteroscedastic-consistent z-values are in parentheses.
* denotes statistical significance at the 0.05 level.
** denotes statistical significance at the 0.01 level.
Sources: IAB Establishment Panel 2000; own estimations.
1 percentage point in Britain). In both countries, branch plants are less
likely to have no collective bargaining and are more likely to be subject
to multi-employer agreements than independent establishments, which
may reflect a spill-over effect from their parent company. In contrast,
newly founded establishments are less likely to make use of multi-
employer bargaining, probably because they require more flexible insti-
tutional arrangements at this early stage of their existence or because they
have not been organized yet by trade unions and employers’ associations.
In addition, industry effects play a significant role in explaining bargain-
ing arrangements in both countries.
The percentage of low-skilled employees in the workforce seems to be
negatively related to multi-employer bargaining, but this effect is statis-
tically significant in Germany only. Foreign ownership or control
increases the probability of no collective bargaining by 10 percentage
points in Britain and 5 points in western Germany, whereas it lowers this
probability by 16 percentage points in eastern Germany.4
Despite these differences in detail, the broad picture is that more or less
the same set of variables is associated with enterprise-level regulation of
the employment relationship in Britain and in both western and eastern
Germany. Although the establishment size effect is much stronger in
eastern than in western Germany and the foreign ownership effect differs
between both regions, we would not conclude from our regressions that
the determinants of bargaining structure in eastern Germany are totally
different from those in western Germany. Moreover, the east German
pattern does not more closely resemble those factors which shape the
‘disorganized decentralized’ British system (as compared to the ‘organized
decentralized’ western German one), as might have been expected given
the different traditions and experience of collective bargaining in the east.
Conclusions
While much international and comparative research has made extensive
use of qualitative data obtained through case studies, there are very few
examples of comparative research based on company and establishment
surveys. Whitfield et al. (1998: 193ff.) make the case for survey-based
comparisons by arguing that case studies could be complemented by such
quantitative research. They suggest that comparing establishment
surveys, if they have common questions and comparable sample popu-
lations, may lead to useful results in an informed international compara-
tive analysis at the micro level, but they also warn that problems of
incompatibility may occur.
In this article we have tried to identify major determinants of collec-
tive bargaining structure by comparing the results of two nationally
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representative establishment surveys for Britain and Germany. As the
institutional framework in both countries differs and as the British data
refer to establishments with 10 or more employees whereas the much
larger German dataset covers all establishments with at least one
employee, our analyses need to be interpreted with care. We also experi-
enced a potential problem of question incompatibility concerning the
dependent variable because the British data focus on pay determination,
whereas the German data do not refer to a particular issue. Since pay
determination is the major issue in collective bargaining in Germany also,
and can be said to determine the choice of bargaining arrangements, and
since the dependent variable chosen is very broad, we think that
incompatibility is not a serious problem. All in all, we feel that the
datasets used and developed possess the characteristic of reasonably close
comparability.
This said, we must admit that the variables analysed represent a small
subset of those available in both datasets, as well as a subset of those that
would be ideal for a comprehensive comparative analysis. Feasibility
clearly qualified desirability. We also acknowledge that surveys and
cross-sectional analyses tell us little about causal relationships and
processes. However, they allow for more comprehensive testing than
other approaches, and they enable us to present a broad picture and to
identify factors that are associated with firms’ choice of a certain level of
collective bargaining. Obviously our approach has to be complemented
with studies using alternative methods.
Despite these qualifications, some interesting results were obtained
from the empirical analyses. For Britain and (western and eastern)
Germany alike, the probability of multi-employer bargaining increases
with size of establishment, which may reflect the advantage of falling
transaction costs. Establishments operating in the public sector are more
likely to make use of collective bargaining and are less likely to rely on
individual regulation than other establishments — an effect that is
particularly strong in Britain. In both countries, branch plants are more
often subject to multi-employer agreements than independent establish-
ments.
The lower bargaining coverage of new establishments and the increas-
ing privatization of companies in the public sector both imply that
coverage will further decline over time, as has been the case in Britain and
Germany in recent decades. However, data limitations make the determi-
nants of changes in firms’ bargaining status difficult to identify (for initial
attempts see Zagelmeyer, 2004a, for Britain, and Kohaut and Schnabel,
2003, for Germany). Further micro research employing future waves of
both datasets should make better use of the panel character of the data.
Combined with macro research on bargaining coverage of the type
employed, for instance, by Traxler et al. (2001), this should enable us to
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obtain a better insight into the determinants of changes in bargaining
institutions.
Our finding that more or less the same set of variables is associated
with firms’ choice of regulation structure for the employment relation-
ship in Britain as in Germany is interesting, since the institutional frame-
work and the bargaining traditions in these countries differ markedly. We
would not claim to have identified a common model which fits both
countries perfectly or which could be generalized to other countries. It
might be interesting to see, however, to what degree these variables also
play a role in other countries whose experiences in the coverage and
evolution of collective bargaining may have been totally different. While
this is beyond the scope of the present study, more comparative research
on the determinants of collective bargaining structure, making use of
micro- and macroeconometric analyses as well as case studies, is clearly
needed.
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NOTES
1 For a qualitative comparative analysis using case studies from Belgium,
Germany, Italy and Britain, see Arrowsmith et al. (2003) and Marginson et
al. (2003).
2 Details regarding these datasets are given in Cully et al. (1999) for WERS98
and Kölling (2000) for the IAB. The two years were chosen because 1998
represents the most recent information available for Britain, and 2000 has
the advantage that it is the year in which the IAB panel was substantially
augmented, while it is still relatively close to the 1998 date for Britain.
3 Kohaut and Schnabel (2003) found similar differences between western and
eastern Germany in their probit analysis of multi-employer collective
bargaining, but they also were not able to provide a simple and convincing
explanation for this result.
4 Two additional variables of interest (and suggested by a referee) would be
the structure of the product market and union presence or strength within
establishments. Unfortunately, information on these variables is not
available in the German dataset. Using the four cross-sectional
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WIRS/WERS datasets, Zagelmeyer (2004a) studied the association between
the presence and level of collective bargaining on the one hand, and (i) union
density and/or (ii) geographical scope of the product market and/or (iii) the
extent of competition on the other. There were no stable results over time.
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TABLE A-1. Definition and Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent and Independent Variables
Variable Description and coding Sample N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Bargaining arrangements Categorical variable: 1 = no CB, 2 = single- Britain 2125 1.65 1.79 1 3
employer CB, 3 = multi-employer CB W. Germany 8006 2.24 0.94 1 3
E. Germany 5301 1.85 0.94 1 3
Establishment size Continuous variable: Number of employees Britain 2125 286.94 851.91 10 28,971
working at the establishment W. Germany 8006 242.15 938.71 1 41,638
E. Germany 5301 119.89 313.89 1 5,715
Establishment size squared Continuous variable: Number of employees Britain 2125 807746.9 1.88e+07 100 8.39e+08
working at the establishment squared W. Germany 8006 939697.4 2.24e+07 1 1.73e+09
E. Germany 5301 112563.0 1001250 1 3.27e+07
Branch plant Dummy variable: Establishment is part of a Britain 2125 0.79 0.40 0 1
multi-establishment organization = 1 W. Germany 8006 0.22 0.42 0 1
E. Germany 5301 0.19 0.39 0 1
Establishment age Dummy variable: Establishment has been Britain 2125 0.16 0.36 0 1
operating at this address for up to W. Germany 8006 0.10 0.30 0 1
5 years = 1 E. Germany 5301 0.17 0.38 0 1
Low-skilled employees Continuous variable: Percentage of total Britain 2125 30.09 26.43 0 100
employees who are routine lower-skilled W. Germany 8006 26.77 27.98 0 100
manual or clerical and secretarial E. Germany 5301 14.29 23.09 0 100
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TABLE A-1. Continued
Variable Description and coding Sample N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Foreign ownership/control Dummy variable: Workplace is Britain 2125 0.10 0.31 0 1
predominantly foreign owned (51 percent W. Germany 8006 0.06 0.25 0 1
or more) = 1 E. Germany 5301 0.02 0.15 0 1
Public sector Dummy variable: Establishment operates in Britain 2125 0.30 0.46 0 1
the public sector = 1 W. Germany 8006 0.16 0.37 0 1
E. Germany 5301 0.20 0.40 0 1
Sources: WERS98; IAB Establishment Panel 2000.
